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Fuzzy But Not Warm:
On the (Continuing) Descriptive and Analytical
Inutility of "Spirituality"
Chad M. Bauman, Eugene V. Gallagher, Davina C. Lopez'

In her response, Nadine Pence helpfully turns the conversation towards
actual practices in teaching and the array of practical decisions that have to
be made in the classroom and on campuses when it comes to addressing
"Big Questions" and students' aspirations and interior lives. Several dimen
sions of her argument are worth amplification. Pence appropriately notes
that at least some of the "meaning-making activities of human groups have
been done without reference to a god or to a supra-natural force" (p. 133).
Since repeated practice in the accurate and precise use of descriptive and
analytical language is an important part of the collegiate classroom experi
ence in the humanities, it is at least "awkward" (p. 133) if not damaging to
students and their objects of study to categorize wholly secular perspec
tives on human life as in some ways constituting "spiritualities." Such an
interpretive move goes well beyond devising a capacious category for pur
poses of comparison to outright misreading of the primary evidence. To
make that kind of category mistake is to fail the minimal requirements for
descriptive adequacy. As the philosopher of religion Wayne Proudfoot puts
it, "where it is the subject's experience which is the object of study, that
experience must be identified under a description that can plausibly be at
tributed to him."2 In simple terms, it is a fundamental distortion of the
evidence either to claim or to imply that every person has a "spirituality,"
especially, as Pence notes, "when the understanding itself is explicit that
there is no such thing as a 'spirit'" (p. 133).
We are happy to hear in Alexander and Helen Astin's response that
their subsequent studies and reports have recognized the problems inherent
in measuring the prevalence of "spirituality" by asking questions that em
ploy versions of the word, and for this reason have shifted to the language
of "spiritual identification." And the fact, as the Astins suggest, that the
index displayed a high internal consistency (Alpha = .89) between the 13
elements of the scale is of course not at all surprising given, as they say, that
"12 of the 13 items making up this scale included some version of the word
'spiritual''' (p. 127). Be that as it may, the questions we are asking are not
Religion & Education, Vol. 36, No.2 (Summer 2009)
Copyright © 2009 by the University of North em Iowa

142 Religion and Education
concerned with whether the measure is consistent within itself, but whether
this consistency tells us anything meaningful about the nature of "spiritual
ity," or even about what people understand it to mean in any given historical
moment and ideological climate in the United States. We remain
unconvinced that all of those who identify with the word "spirituality" un
derstand it to mean the same thing. And we are therefore, in the language
of sociologists who specialize in survey methodology, questioning the inter
rater, or inter-observer, reliability of the study's variables, and especially
the most central of its variables, i.e., "spirituality."
Although the Astins detail in their response the careful methods and
multiple refinements oftheir approach to survey research, it cannot be said
that the same level of care is evidenced when enthusiasts for "Spirituality in
Higher Education" declare without hesitance that literally everyone has a
spirituality.3 In effect, such pronouncements impoverish students' encoun
ters with the diversity of ways of making sense ofthe world through unwar
ranted homogenization. They also suggest that teachers and students need
not take seriously people's own descriptions of and questions about their
experience and points of view, even as an analytical starting point. That
stance yields the unsettling prospect of having either a teacher or student
declare that while person X claims to be an atheist, person X "really" is
"spiritual." Such an approach to the reading of primary data begs, but does
nothing to answer, the question of when individuals' descriptions of their
own experiences and perspectives on the world are to be taken seriously
and when they are not-and on what bases. Perhaps considering the re
versed statement can drive the point home. Enthusiasts for "Spirituality in
Higher Education" seem unwilling to entertain the possibility that person X
claims to be "spiritual" but is "really" suffering from psychological malad
aptation. It is difficult indeed to discern how assertions that depend on
dismissing out of hand first-person testimonies could produce the kind of
"real infonnation" about actual practices and beliefs that Pence rightly claims
is the subject matter for the religious studies classroom. The extension of
"spirituality" to categorize explicitly secular viewpoints obfuscates rather
than clarifies. At the very least, such an extension indirectly implies that
secular understandings of the way the world works are somehow underde
veloped, inferior, diminished, and not worthy of serious, sustained consider
ation. But in the undergraduate humanities classroom those value judg
ments should be the topics for discussion and debate, with their supporting
arguments open to explicit challenge and defense-rather than being treated,
by implication, as self-evident truths.
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Pence additionally expresses wariness about calls for the classroom to
be a site for explicit efforts to promote student ''fonnation and maturation"
(p. 135). She wonders whether that focus would "weight the classroom too
much toward the personal life of the student and places the subject matter
of the course into competition with student needs" (p. 135). On this topic
the findings of the GTU studies may only be of limited value to those teach
ing in large state universities, community colleges, or religiously unaffiliated
colleges. In those venues the originally Christian language of "fonnation"
can stand in some tension with institutional missions that cannot be seen as
endorsing a particular religious point of view as well as diverse student
popUlations where the notion of religious formation may be different for
those in non-Christian traditions, and alien to those who maintain a secular
view of the world.
Another producti ve question raised by Pence concerns the type of work
that is appropriate to the classroom and the type of work that is best under
taken in other settings, and sometimes by other people, in the contemporary
college or university. What should teachers strive to accomplish in their 45
or so classroom contact hours in a given semester? Most institutions fea
ture robust Student Life staffs and substantial counseling services. The
people who work in those sectors of higher education have extensive train
ing in their chosen fields and may well have skills that individual teachers do
not, raising the question of which dimensions of students' "fonnation and
maturation" are best addressed outside of the classroom and best left in the
hands of other professionals. It does not appear to be an accident, then,
that Student Life staff and other administrators are so prominent in the
"Spirituality in Higher Education" movement. But while they may have the
appropriate tools to create contexts and guide discussions of some of the
"big questions," if the literature produced by the movement is any indication
they also bring with them taken-for-granted conceptions, like the central
concept of "spirituality," that have rarely been subjected to the careful scru
tiny and contestation that is the hallmark of the contemporary academy.
Our essays in this volume have attempted to do just that.
None of us would deny that the intellectual growth and maturation of
students is a primary goal of their collegiate experience and that their col
lege years are an appropriate time for grappling with big questions. What
we vigorously dispute is that any wrestling with those questions must nec
essarily constitute a "spirituality." There is ample contemporary and his
torical evidence that many have succeeded in answering to their own satis
faction big questions about human life without appealing to religious or "spiri
tual" warrants. Freud's sweeping dismissal of religious beliefs as wish
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fulfillments and illusions and his epigrammatic recommendation of "educa
tion to reality" represent a pointed and memorable example. 4 Serious con
sideration of such secular answers to life's big questions, in comparison to
traditional religious and contemporary "spiritual" ones, can only enrich col
legiate conversations about them both in the classroom and outside it. Forced
conversions of secular viewpoints into putatively "spiritual" ones, and reli
gious and "spiritual" viewpoints into secular ones, can only impoverish those
same conversations by promoting a taken-for-granted and unexamined ho
mogeneity. If training in argument is the sine qua non of undergraduate
education, 5 the fullest possible range of arguments about the answers to big
questions should be introduced to students so that through the patient and
detailed work of comparison they can, for themselves, evaluate their strengths
and weakness and develop the ability to defend and extend their own judg
ments. The premature amalgamation of even atheist perspectives into an
all-encompassing but amorphous "spirituality" deprives students of the op
portunities to consider seriously what some people have perceived to be a
compelling way of understanding life in this world but also of a potential
whetstone against which they can sharpen their own perspectives.
Beyond the partiCUlarities of the HERl surveys there are numerous
historical, individual, institutional, and ideological issues, and it is on those
issues rather than on the mechanics of survey research that we have fo
cused all along. We can raise only a few more of those issues in this brief
response. First, whether it is acknowledged by its partisans or not, the
contemporary interest in spirituality, often explicitly constructed in opposi
tion to a distinctive if implicit understanding of what constitutes religion, has
its own pedigree. Leigh Schmidt describes it as "a historically shaped tradi
tion of its own" that developed in the 19 th century United States among an
array of religious liberals as "a search for a religious world larger than the
British Protestant inheritance."6 Schmidt's even-handed appraisal of that
tradition provides a bracing antidote to the exuberant enthusiasm of some in
the "Spirituality in Higher Education" movement. He also argues that "spot
ted with its own failed inclusions, dubious appropriations and misguided causes,
the Spiritual Left must also know itself as a tradition of mixed blessings."7
Precisely what is missing in some of the more far-reaching endorsements
of Spirituality in Higher Education is just that sense of mixed blessings, of
the benefits and drawbacks, for example, of imputing a "spirituality" to
those who would wholeheartedly reject the notion.
Writing from what he calls the "worldly" as opposed to the spiritual
Left, Roland Boer offers a different history for the contemporary embrace
of spirituality. He contends that "the rise of spirituality is a major-I hesi
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tate to write 'first'-sign of the tensions within secularism and the begin
nings of post-secularism.',g Boer denies that the contemporary fascination
with spirituality can be traced to a hunger for meaning that is located be
yond the material, and he argues that the conception of spirituality as prima
rily a private affair that is, and should be, separate from someone's various
engagements with the world actually echoes the typical emphases of secu
larism. Focusing specifically on the Christian Bible, Boer asserts that "the
assumption that you need to believe in order to be interested in the Bible
would have to be one of the strangest making the rounds today."9 Follow
ing Boer's lead, we submit that the assumption that you have to be spiritual
in order to address life's big questions is at least equally strange. In the
terms of Pence's response, neither a spiritual nor a secular approach to
making meaning is a necessary pre-requisite to addressing fundamental
questions of meaning; nor does addressing fundamental questions of mean
ing necessarily indicate that one is religious or spiritual. To assert the
contrary of either position is to deny the diversity of human approaches to
life's big issues. At a time when diversity of all sorts plays such a prominent
role in the missions of institutions of higher education, that seems ill-advised,
to say the least.
Second, Schmidt's location of the genesis of the contemporary em
brace of spirituality among a group of 19 1h century liberal Protestants and
their fellow travelers also provides a context for our concern that the "Spiri
tuality in Higher Education" movement represents, again whether intention
ally or not, an effort in the direction of a re-Protestantization of American
collegiate education. Schmidt identifies the rudiments of the 19 lh century
religious liberalism in which the focus on "spirituality" took shape as the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Individual aspiration after mystical experience or reli
gious feeling
The valuing of silence, solitude, and serene meditation
The immanence of the transcendent-in each person
and in nature
The cosmopolitan appreciation of religious variety as
well as unity in diversity
Ethical earnestness in pursuit of justice-producing re
forms or "social salvation"
An emphasis on creative self-expression and adven
turesome seeking. 1O
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Clearly, those characteristics of 19 m century American religious liberalism
are remarkably congruent with the evocations of "spirituality" that domi
nate the discourse of the movement to promote Spirituality in Higher Edu
cation. They also express a distinctively Protestant Christian understanding
of both religion and "spirituality." We remain very concerned that, should
such characteristics continue to be unquestioningly accepted as limning the
outlines of contemporary spirituality, they will in effect reinforce a Protes
tant hegemony in the discourse about spirituality. Partisans of "Spirituality
in Higher Education" would do well to attend to the potential exclusionary
effects of such an unexamined conception of "spirituality" might have for
those who do not accept or endorse a Protestant way of understanding their
own ways of making sense of the world, including those who espouse un
flinchingly secular viewpoints.
Those who advocate for "Spirituality in Higher Education," and par
ticularly those implicated and invested in the analysis of HERI survey data
regarding the spiritual proclivities of college students, might suggest that an
implicit Protestant emphasis does not hold since contemporary college stu
dents, in fact, declare themselves to belong to many Christian denomina
tions and other of the world's religious traditions. Such a plurality of reli
gious commitment, seemingly demonstrable through empirical data, appears
to belie a measure of healthy religious diversity among college students.
One possible conclusion from such a representation is that people across
religious traditions are concerned with "spirituality." Herein resides an im
portant analytical problem with which people who study and teach religion
professionally are rightly concerned. We contend that the criteria and as
sumptions infused into assertions about spirituality and religion betray an
unarticulated Protestant Christian framework that is presented as natural,
inevitable, and universal--even as it deploys a modicum of rhetoric toward
vaguely valuing religious pluralism. As Tomoko Masuzawa has recently
argued, the very idea of "world religions" developed from European pro
cesses of comparison and classification according to relationships with Prot
estant Christianity at a particular historical moment in northern Europe, and
discourses invoking religious pluralism and multiculturalism often reify Prot
estant assumptions while simultaneously hiding them. 11 Following Masuzawa,
let us reiterate here that the point is not whether proponents of "Spirituality
in Higher Education" name their latent, or not-so-Iatent, Protestantism. The
point, for teachers and researchers in religious studies, is precisely that
these researchers and interpreters do not do such naming, thus allowing
Protestant presuppositions to shape the discourse on "spirituality," even across
religious traditions-a range of traditions that are themselves defined, cat
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egorized, and evaluated in relationship to hegemonic conceptions of "spiri
tuality" and "religion."
Such a circular process has the appearance of what philosopher Jean
BaudriIlard famously called "the hyperreal"-that is to say, a system of
signs and significations referring only to themselves in their own closed
semantic universe, producing a map so detailed that it covers, erases, and
replaces the actual terrain it is meant to represent. l2 In this case the actual
terrain of people's provisional and relational conceptions of themselves and
the world, and real questions thereof, has been mapped over by a simulacrum
of "spirituality"-and, perhaps, a simulacrum of higher education as well.
Furthermore, attempts to close the system within the discourse of "Spiritu
ality in Higher Education," evidenced by significant rhetorical maneuvers
attempting to preclude the possibility of critical appraisal and intervention,
serve the ideological function of suggesting that nothing lies outside of that
discourse-which is in itself a clue as to the discourse's embedded Protes
tant universalism. I)
Third, we noted in our indi vidual contributions that the "Spirituality in
Higher Education" movement advocates far-reaching changes in Ameri
can higher education. In addition to raising questions about the appropriate
division of responsibility for aspects of student development in contempo
rary colleges and universities, Dena Pence has aptly pointed out some of
the ways in which those changes might impact a religious studies class
room. Her concern about how strong interest in students' "formation and
maturation" might displace the designated subject matter of a course (see
p. 9) is well-founded and clearly articulated. One of the things that is still
missing in the broad programmatic statements in favor of introjecting "spiri
tuality" into higher education is precisely how that is to be done in specific
courses, offered within the constraints of particular programmatic and insti
tutional contexts, by faculty members with certain kinds of expertise. Since
it may appear self-evident to some that courses in the study of religion may
address big questions or issues of "spirituality," and that the religion class
room is a logical place for the implementation of a curriculum focused on
"spirituality," that does not excuse the proponents of "Spirituality in Higher
Education" from explaining in some detail just how treatments of those
broad topics within specific courses are to be used to promote student for
mation and maturation, without turning students' away from the subject
matter at hand and towards, only or primarily, their own appropriation or
rejection of it. More challenging, perhaps, is figuring out the actual role of
the chemistry teacher or elementary foreign language instructor in carrying
out a lightly outlined program to promote spirituality among college
students.
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Finally, efforts to promote spirituality in collegiate life raise difficult and
contentious ideological questions. The most far-reaching promoters of "Spiri
tuality in Higher Education," when they sometimes claim directly and other
times imply that everyone is in some way spiritual, appear to be indirectly
mounting a case against all secular views of the world and critiques of
religion, be they inspired by Marx, Freud, or anyone else. The assertion that
even atheists possess a "spirituality" is simply a convoluted way of assert
ing that secular views of the world hold no credibility, cannot be taken to
mean what they actually say, and can be dismissed out of hand. There may
even be echoes of a distant but distinct religious or at least "spiritual"
triumphalism that longs to trumpet the demise of the secular. At its core,
then, the "Spirituality in Higher Education" movement would represent a
politics by another name. If so, we ask only that its politics be clearly
declared and opened to the kind of careful, patient, and probing consider
ation that represents American higher education at its best.
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